This article discusses the relevance and applicability of the 'post-religional paradigm' as proposed by EATWOT (Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians) in the Asian contexts. It also inquires on how the Asian phenomenon and its interpretations relate to the crisis of religions in Western societies. It attempts to answer this problematic through four steps: a summary of the theological proposal and its relationship with the Western sociologies of religion; a search for a viable framework with which to understand religions in post-secular societies; discussion on the "discourses of Asia" and the corresponding view on religion; an elaboration of my preferred framework with some examples from the Asian situation. I argue that a viable theological proposal on post-religional paradigm should start from the analysis of how religious discourses and practices navigate with concrete socio-historical forces on the ground. Consequent to this view is the assertion that there is no universal sociology/theology of religion's development but multiple and complex religious discourses in specific contexts.
Introduction
We are experiencing the advent of a "post-religional" society, proclaims the proposal-hypothesis of the International Theological Commission of EATWOTEcumenical Association of Third World Theologian 1 (EATWOT, 2012) . The task asked of me in this article is to inquire "whether the post-religional interpretation of the current crisis of religion operates in the Asian context, at least in some sectors of society, if not in the majority of the population. What is its prognosis in Asia? How is this analysis related to the crisis in Western societies?" I would like to answer these questions in four steps. First, I will try to elaborate the proposal vis-à-vis other parallel Western paradigms. Second, I will forward three different interpretations of the present phenomenon through some representative thinkers on religion. Third, I will explore the repercussions of these theories in the discourse of 'Asia'. Finally, in conclusion, I will expound e my preferred framework through some examples from Asian contexts.
The Post-Religional Paradigm
EATWOT's post-religional paradigm describes its theological proposal through a contemporary metaphor. As an airplane takes off and folds its wheels in, it begins to rely on a new and totally different system -that of its wings. It is so with humankind. As the old Neolithic religions cease to exist, human communities undergo a difficult adjustment to a totally different axiological system. "The duty of a responsible theology is to foresee these problems and try to accompany the inevitable 'transit' in which we already find ourselves." (EATWOT, 2012, p. 273) .
We can summarize the theological proposal in four main points. First, religions have not always existed. Religion first appeared at the start of the Neolithic era when the hunters and gatherers began to settle in agricultural landscapes, thus, transforming their ways of life in new permanent territories. 
Framing the Discourse in a Wider Context
The theological proposal above is not at all novel in the field of theology and social sciences. I would like to situate this discourse from the perspective of the wider debate in the sociology of religions. First, the post-religional paradigm has affinities with the evolutionary theories of religion. Second, it is also related to the secularization debate in contemporary Western societies. In fact, the question whether this phenomenon is happening in Asia or not is in part a Western preoccupation. I will attempt to locate the post-religional paradigm in these discourses in order to better understand its underlying assumptions.
Evolutionary Views of Religion
In recent years, we have seen the emergence of evolutionary theories of religion, the most prominent proponent of which is the American sociologist, Robert Bellah. In his latest book, Religion and Human Evolution (2011), 3 Bellah argues that religions evolve with human society as they adjust into its different stages: tribal, archaic and axial ages. Religious development moves from pure ritual 283 (tribal) to the mythical (archaic) and the theoretical (axial). As it goes through these phases, it conserves what has been developed so that "nothing is ever lost" in the process (BELLAH, 2014) . Crucial to this development is the Axial age which makes religions universal, theoretical and critical. Axial religions eschew previous tendencies to dominate as they critique the repressive status quo and advance ethical ways of life. The four Axial civilizations (and religions) which Bellah discusses are Ancient Israel, India, China and Greece whose civilizations and literatures constitute a "breakthrough" in human thinking and cultures.
Other contemporary sociologists of religion follow Bellah's lead. In The Great Transformation Karen Armstrong (2007) also discusses the development of the Axial age as the foundation of our religious traditions. "During this period of intense creativity, spiritual and philosophical geniuses pioneered an entirely new kind of human experience." (BELLAH, 2007, p. xvi) . Recovering this era leads us to important directions religions should tread in our times. Armstrong is clear on what these lessons are: personal responsibility and self-criticism to be followed by effective action and compassion. Contrary to religion's usual emphasis on doctrine, "what mattered was not what you believed but how you behaved." (BELLAH, 2007, p. 
xviii).
Bellah and Armstrong's focus on the Axial Age has been adapted from the periodization put forward by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1954, p. 98-104; 1953, p. 24-26) . Jaspers theorized four basic segments of history: the Promethean age (the use of language, the kindling of fire, the invention of tools); the ancient high civilizations in Egypt and Mesopotamia (5000-3000 BCE); the Axial Age (800-200 BCE); and the age of science and technology (medieval Europe). What is crucial is the third segment; it is "the axis in history", the pivotal age of civilization. This is the age of Confucius and Lao Tse in China; of the Upanishads and Buddha in India; of Homer, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato in Greece; of Zarathustra in Iran; and of the great prophets Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah in Palestine. All these developments grew independently of one another. Jasper argues that during the Axial age, humans became "aware of being as a whole, of himself and his limits... raised radical questions, approached the abyss in his drive for liberation and redemption... and experienced the absolute in the depth of selfhood and in the clarity of transcendence (JASPER, 1954, p. 99) .
The evolutionary direction is common to EATWOT's post-religional paradigm and Bellah's (and Armstrong's) works. 4 Except for a change of names, Bellah generally followed Jasper's periodization in order to bring out his triple framework (play, myth and theory), the peak moment of which is the Axial period (BELLAH; JOAS, 2012). The post-religional paradigm, for its part, also adheres to this evolutionary scheme in its rough periodization from Paleolithic to Neolithic and beyond. These contemporary directions are not a new trend in the sociology of religion.
Anthropological and sociological sciences both privileged this evolutionary worldview in the second half of the nineteenth century (TURNER, 2011, p. 285-301) . That society (and its religions) develops from its "primitive" stages to its more "civilized" ones has been a common refrain from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, from E. B. Tylor to J. G. Frazer.
Beyond their evolutionary commonalities, however, these two schemes (Bellah and the post-religional paradigm) move along divergent paths. First, Bellah traces the origins of religions to as early as the Big Bang, the emergence of life up to the point when homo sapiens learned to play, mimic rituals and narrate cosmic and cultural myths. In Bellah's reflection, all these are stirrings of religion as their "core processes" are conserved and carried over to the next stage of development (JOAS, 2012) . 5 The post-religional paradigm, on the other hand, thinks that even as spirituality/religiosity is co-extensive with humanity, religions only began to be practiced during the Neolithic phase when humans started to 4 On Bellah's evolutionary religious paradigm, see WUTHNOW, 1992. Bellah, however, qualifies his position vis-à-vis the evolutionary paradigm. It is not about the evolution of religion itself as the place of religion in the evolutionary process, thus, the revision of the title of the work from "Religious Evolution" (BELLAH, 1964) to "Religion in Human Evolution" (BELLAH, 2011 ). Cf. JOAS, 2014 In an interview, Bellah explicates what is meant by the formula "nothing is ever lost" which keeps reappearing in his text. "It again goes all the way back because the subatomic particles in our body were produced by the Big Bang, so parts of our body are 13.7 billion years old. Every cell in our body is genealogically descended from single cell organisms, which we call familiarly "bacteria." So even biologically we haven't lost anything. We've developed enormously new complex structures, but on the basis of things that remain fundamental for us all around." This is true for cultures as it is for religion -from the way we deal with the body, with our myths and narratives, with our theological and ethical theories (JOAS, 2012) .
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settle in agrarian societies. In short, there was a (long) time when religions did not exist at all. While Bellah's positive and evolutionary worldview assumes everything toward the next stage, the post-religional paradigm feels obliged to discard Neolithic religions when this civilizational phase is over. While Bellah's vision is cumulative, the post-religional view consists of religio-cultural breaks and shifts.
This difference points to a larger epistemological debate on the notion of scientific and cultural development. On the one hand, modern science has always been viewed through the lens of evolutionary progress. Scientific, cultural and intellectual progress developed through an evolving, continuous and cumulative process. Like Bellah, "nothing is ever lost". Each new discovery leads to the unravelling of the nature and truth of reality. On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn attacked this evolutionary idea and argued that there is "no coherent direction of ontological development" in science; one does not approach truth in a cumulative manner. Newton is not a development of Aristotle and Einstein is not an evolution of Newton. In fact, "Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle than... to Newton." (KUHN, 1970, p. 206-207) . Kuhn thinks that science moves more through "revolutions" than evolution. In crisis moments, a new paradigm appears which provides a better explanation for new scientific, historical and cultural constellations. This alternative paradigm does not build on old data; rather, scientists "work in a different world" which is incommensurable with the old. Science is thus not cumulative. When a new paradigm appears, the previous one becomes obsolete. Thus, the phenomenon of the "dying of religions" in the post-religional paradigm is nearer to Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts than to Bellah's.
A second observation follows the first. While Bellah views the Axial age as a pivotal and positive development from which contemporary discussion needs to learn, the post-religional paradigm assumes that the Axial age only reinforces the authoritarian and hegemonic tendencies of Neolithic religions. These observations are crucial because they point to two divergent views with which religions are seen in these two paradigms. For Bellah and other thinkers like him, religion understood as mimetic, mythic and theoretic meaning-making has always been there from the beginning and just needs to be recovered in order to help us answer questions of our time. In contrast, the post-religional programmatic scheme hopes that these religions will fade and die so that new liberating forms of spiritualities can arise.
We shall come back to engage these evolutionary paradigms in a discussion below.
Religions and Secularization
EATWOT's post-religional paradigm can also be read alongside the ongoing lively debate on secularization and post-secularization in Western societies. The words of the proposal-hypothesis sound ambivalent but a closer reading reveals a parallel analysis.
The present crisis is not due to secularisation processes, or to a loss of values, or to the dissemination of materialism or hedonism (blaming interpretation usually held by religions' officers), neither to the lack of testimony or to the moral scandals of religion, but to [the] birth of a new cultural situation, that puts an end to the radical transformations of the knowledge, axiological and epistemological Neolithic structures, transformation that started with the scientific revolution in the XVI century, the Enlightenment of the XVIII century and the various waves of industrialisation. The symptoms that this gradual transformation produces appear in ways such as certain diffuse agnosticism, loss of epistemological ingenuity, a more accentuated critical sense, a more utilitarian conceptualisation of religions as a service to the human being instead of receptors of full loyalty from their members, the disappearance of the idea of a "unique true religion" and a revealed moral (EATWOT, 2012, p. 270) .
Despite its denial that the crisis of religion is not a consequence of secularization processes, the "radical transformation" of "axiological and epistemological neolithic structures" starting with scientific revolution, Rumor of Angels (BERGER, 1969) . He now thinks that "secularization may not be as all-embracing as some have thought"; it is not absolute and unstoppable (BERGER, 1969, p. 30) . Ordinary life occurrences point us to transcendence ("the beyond in our midst"): our propensity for order, play and humor, sense of hope, capacity for moral outrage, etc. This post-secular discourse of the return of religion has wide and diverse expressions ranging from the denial of secularization to reenchantment with art and cultures, from reappearance of religion in public life to its engagement with politics, philosophy and theology. 8
How does the post-religional paradigm handle the secularization debate? It manages it by distinguishing religions from spirituality/religiosity. It believes that agrarian-neolithic religions fade but spirituality is universal.
Religions are forms, historical, contingent, and changing, while spirituality is a dimension that constitutes humanity, permanent, and essential to the human being. Spirituality may be experienced within or outside religions. We could do without religions, but we will never be able to dispense with human being's dimension of transcendence (EATWOT, 2012, p. 266 The same is true with belonging. In terms of hard indicators like weekly church attendance, the response would be less. But when the notion of belonging is softened, as when they are asked r about their preferred place for funeral services, many would stick to their church's affiliation. Generally, in Europe, "[t]he historic churches are public utilities, and you expect public utilities to be there when you need them." (DAVIE, 2005) . This prompts another author to reverse the formula:
belonging without believing (HERVIEU-LÉGER, 2004, p. 101-119) .
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In short, while EATWOT's post-religional proposal hails the death of religions in consonance with secularization theories, it also welcomes different expressions of religiosities as forms of the new cultural configuration together with the post-secular discourses. Unlike the post-religional paradigm, however, not all post-secular discourses clearly distinguish religion from spirituality (i.e., with the religions 'dying' and spiritualities slowly emerging). While the US version maintains the public-private spaces for religion and spirituality respectively, religions do not actually disappear. Traditional religions continue to exist though no longer popularly practiced in public by the majority of the members. The
European experience also strategically retains public religions when these become quite helpful for the "rainy days", as it were. Moreover, secular public rituals like royal weddings or World Cup finals, most of which are well-attended, also take on new 'religious' forms that demand devout, almost fanatical, allegiance.
Let me summarize my arguments thus far. The plot has continually thickened in the secularization debate and the post-religional paradigm is complicit with it. Originally, the secularization thesis purported to have an evolutionary, universalist and progressive inevitability. With the coming of modernity, religions were envisioned to eventually disappear. Atheism was supposed to be the end game. But it is precisely this modern prediction that is put into question by postsecular discourses. Instead of being disenchanted, the world is in fact reenchanted. Instead of being secularized, it is in fact desecularized. Not only are there multiple "modernities", there are also multiple "secularities" that bring about multiple "religious identities". There has been no one direction. 10 Religions did not undergo a radical break caused by one local experience of European Enlightenment since there were as many modernities as there were cultures. As modernities interacted with religions, both transformed each other such that a part of each died 10 José Casanova gives this insightful observation: "In our global age, it has become increasingly evident that European secular developments are not a universal norm for the rest of the world; that, as the rest of the world modernizes, people are not becoming more secular like us, but are becoming more religious -or, actually, they are becoming simultaneously both more secular and more religious, which of course only confuses our binary categories. But once it becomes obvious that the secularization of Europe is, comparatively speaking, rather exceptional, the old theory that explained Europe's secularity in terms of its modernity is no longer plausible." (CASANOVA, 2013, p.54) and another part arose anew. Or, better still (and this point differs from the postreligional praradigm), maybe there was no dying and rising, but instead a mutual negotiation and transformation in differing contexts. Some call the present moment a "twilight"; others think of it as the "dawn" of human experience (CASANOVA, 2010, p. 265-281) . Some call it "decline"; others call it "revival" or "resurgence" of new religions.
From the perspective of the Western experience of monotheistic religions, this polytheistic phenomenon is viewed either as "crisis" of religions (as the postreligional paradigm calls it) that causes upheaval or it is a trend that is so novel and postmodern which calls for some celebration. But for non-Western peoples, immersed as they are in pluralist and multi-religious universes, what is happening in the West looks like "the old state of affairs." (CASANOVA, 2006) . It has always been this way ever since in their own contexts. Whichever view one takes, however, depends upon the theoretical paradigm one adapts vis-à-vis both religion and secularity. This brings me to the next point.
Theorizing Religions in a Post-Secular Society
However the present situation is called, all descriptions point to a "post- 
Return to Religion
The first position is heavily forwarded by the Radical Orthodoxy group with
John Milbank as its representative thinker. His influential book Theology and
Social Theory 11 attempts to dismantle the works of modernity in secular politics, capitalist economy, sociology, dialectical philosophy and postmodernity (all offspring of the Enlightenment) in order to recover the displaced Christendom and its offer of absolute ontological peace. Milbank begins his narrative with a programmatic "once upon a time" phrase:
Once there was no secular. And the secular was not latent, waiting to fill more space with the steam of the 'purely human', when the pressure of the sacred was relaxed. Instead there was the single community of Christendom with its dual aspects of sacerdotium and regnum (MILBANK, 2006, p. 9) .
Against the secularization thesis, Milbank thinks that society has no purely human dimension waiting to be uncovered, obscured as it is with the medieval religious hegemony. He rightly argues that the "social" of modern social theory "was in itself as unreal, unhistorical and quasi-theological category." (MILBANK, 2006, p. xii) . In agreement with post-secular thinkers, Milbank contends that the secular actually needed to be invented, constructed and imagined starting from Hugo Grotius's etsi Deus non daretur to the modern sociological project of "disenchantment". Milbank maintains that the secular has "positioned" theology.
"If theology no longer seeks to position, qualify or criticize other discourses, then it is inevitable that that these discourses will position theology." (MILBANK, 2006, p. 1 transcends the party and its norms." (RATZINGER, 2009, p. 56) . In the end, the common thread that runs in the minds of both thinkers (and in agreement with the secularization thesis) is that the hegemonic dominance of modern secular theory is responsible for the decline of religion. However, unlike the secularization theory which sings dirges of religion's demise, Milbank (and Ratzinger) intends to resurrect religion's influence on its own terms in our post-secular society since it is only this faith that has affinity to truth. 
Dialectical Confrontation
Unlike the first position, the second direction represented by Jürgen
Habermas and Charles Taylor confronts modernity head-on and proposes a dialectical interaction with it. Habermas was responsible for placing the term "post-secular" on the academic screen . 13 In his earlier works, he rejoiced in the fact the communicative rationality in the secular public sphere has replaced religion or national sentiments (its irrationality and fanaticism included) as the integrating factor of the social body. In recent works HABERMAS, 2010) , however, he argues for a dialogue between secular reason and religions, recognizing that both religious and secular mentalities help in the building of a humane society. In this updated view, bringing religious discourse into the public sphere not only makes religious people feel "included", but also enlists religious resources in the forging of public life. For this dialogue to happen, religious citizens should be able to accept the natural conditions of modern society, e.g., pluralism, the rule of law, the authority of science, and others. Believers should also be able to translate their religious language into an understandable secular idiom that can resonate in the public sphere. The secularists, for their part, also need to acknowledge that religions possess some truth as their own contribution so social emancipation. "Secular citizens are expected not to exclude a fortiori that they may discover, even in religious utterances, semantic contents and covert personal intuitions that can be translated and introduced into a secular discourse." (HABERMAS, 2008, p. 29) .
This complementary learning process frees people from their religious and cultural closed universes so that all citizens "mutually recognize one another in civil society as members of one and the same political community." (HABERMAS, 2008, p. 22-23) .
Charles Taylor Taylor, secularization thus does not only refer to the decline of religious practice or the consignment of religion into the private (which is the main tenet of main secularization theories), but also to the "conditions of belief", that is, the fact that "belief" comes to be seen as one mere option among the many. If secularization is understood this way, the word "post-secular" already becomes superfluous if used to describe the present situation as the term is already incorporated into secularism's meaning (WARNER, 2010, p. 22-23 
Analyzing Discourses in Context
The First, Asad takes issue with Clifford Geertz's universalist but also dualistic definition of religion as external "systems of symbols" which effect internal "moods and motivations" in the participants (GEERTZ, 1973) . This interpretivist and psychological approach to religion, Asad claims, is forgetful of the fact that power creates religion.
How does power create religion? To ask this question is to seek an answer in terms of the social disciplines and social forces which come together at particular historical moments, to make particular religious discourses, practices and spaces possible... Universal definitions of religion hinder such investigations because and to the extent that they aim at identifying essences when we should be trying to explore concrete sets of historical relations and processes (ASAD, 1983, p.252) .
Transhistorical notions of religion, because of its universalizing and essentializing mode, 15 detach us from the cognition of the domains of power inherent in religious practices and discourses.
Second, the notion of the "secular" and the "modern" prevalent in secularization theories and post-secular discourses also falls into the same trap. For instance, "modernity" (which is often contrasted with "tradition") has always been understood as homogeneous reality with some common identifiable elements that hang together. In terms of social structures, these would be elements of industrialization, secularization, democracy. Modernity is also identified as one philosophical project from Descartes to Habermas. Or, it consists of specific psychological or aesthetic experiences (e.g., Kant's universal taste and aesthetic judgment, etc.). And since these aspects of Western modernity have come together historically in Europe (and North America), "all these things must and should fall together in the rest of the world." (ASAD, 1996) . 16 Like religion, values then become essentialized and get to be contrasted with each other, e.g., "modernity"
(progressive, evolving and scientific) vs. "tradition" (unchanging, repetitive and non-rational), and the mixing of the two in any social order is viewed as either as "pathological" (reactionary) or "still in the process" of development towards the Promised Land of modern Paradise. A parallel problem is found in the contrast between the "secular" and the "sacred". Asad argues that the secular is not a development of or a break from the religious because the secular and the religious have always co-existed in time. (ASAD, 2003) . 17 In a sense, modernity and 15 The movement towards universalization of religion is traced by Asad to Immanuel Kant: "But there can only be one religion which is valid for all men and at all times. Thus the different confessions can scarcely be more than the vehicles of religion; these are fortuitous, and may vary with differences in time or place." (KANT, 1991, p. 114; apud ASAD, 1993, p. 42) . 16 See also ASAD, 2003. 17 "The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life. To appreciate this it is not enough to show that what appears to be necessary is really contingent -that in certain respects the 'secular' obviously overlaps the 'religious'. It is a matter of showing how contingencies relate to changes in the grammar of concepts -that is, how the changes in concepts articulate changes in practices." (ASAD, 2003, p. 15 The sacred tends to be immanent in pre-axial cultures; the transcendent is not necessarily 'religious' in some axial civilizations. The secular is by no means profane in our secular age. One only needs to think of such sacralized secular phenomena as nation, citizenship and human rights (CASANOVA, 2009 (CASANOVA, , p. 1062 (CASANOVA, -1063 . 18 To summarize, we have outlined three approaches to understand the decline and resurgence of religions in post-secular society. The first position is critical of the modernization-secularization process as it causes the retreat of religion.
Milbank's project (and to some extent Ratzinger's) is to recover religion's (understood as Christianity) leading position it once had in the social space. Even as it effectively analyzes the power of modernity to impose its hegemony over religion and to enlist the faith towards its secularist project, its option to re-assert religious hegemony is not viable in contemporary pluralist and global universes.
Worse, it can be seen as a last-ditch attempt to regain a hopelessly losing battle to re-establish once more a new metanarrative that will outplay the rest. The second position seeks a direct confrontation with modern secularity proposing an honest negotiation between religious and secularist worldviews (Habermas) at the same time seeking transcendence in the "immanent frame" (Taylor) . Though laudable, this originally European Enlightenment project also seeks to impose its modern narrative on the rest of the world. In short, it is saying, if the West has undergone this, the rest of the world will follow suit. The third position refuses to essentialize the social realities it analyzes -be it religion, secular modernity, etc. Asad believes that these phenomena, their concrete practices and their narratives are constructed, products as they are of intersecting power relations in specific historical contexts. If we want to assess the state of religion vis-à-vis modernity, for instance, we need to appraise its specific socio-historical conditions of possibility. I feel that this last position is crucial to the question posed at the start: "Is Asia a post-religional society?"
The Discourse of Asia
Despite the theories' divergences, (post)secularization, as we have shown above, is very much a Western debate. The main task of this article is to investigate whether this is also an 'Asian' phenomenon. 19 But which Asia? There are practically 299 two ways of looking at Asia: the imperialist discourse of "Orientalist Asia" and the "Asianist Asia" of the Asian values discourse. The answer to the question of postreligionality of Asia heavily depends on the position one takes in the "discourse of Asia".
(Neo)Orientalist Asia: Imperial Discourse
The 'idea of Asia' did not first come from Asia. It was a European invention (HUI, 2005; HUI, 2006; MILNER; JOHNSON, 1997; MCLNNES, 1998 the Western rationalized juridical system; Asian agrarian mode of production vs.
European cosmopolitan-urban trading. Since Europe was 'the end of history', Asia is incorporated to its 'beginnings', thus, also relegating it to the realm of 'prehistory'. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel, for instance, writes:
The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia is the beginning… The East knew and to the present day knows that One is free; the Greeks and the Roman world, that some are free; the German world knows that All are free. The first 20 "From its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as 'East' and 'West': to channel thought into a West and East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having status of scientific truth." (SAID, 1995, p. 46) . political form, therefore, which we observe in History is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third Monarchy (HEGEL, 1956, p. 103-104) In Third, we have seen how the secularization thesis has been disproven even by Western post-secular authors themselves. But even these post-secular discourses exhibit ethnocentric and universalist tendencies. Habermas thinks that the 'post-secular' is another historical phase that now accommodates religious voices in the public space, thus, also normative for the whole of history. The secularist progression of consciousness that sees modernity -whether or not finished and whether a project or an achievement -as involving a linear, and irreversible, progress away from the 'premodern'. This linear temporality is reflected in the -stillpredominant pictures of scientific progress, societal emancipation, and functional differentiation that also inform Habermas' writings (LEEZENBERG, 2010, p. 95 ).
In the same vein, Charles Taylor was not to Europeanize Asia. It was in reality an act of confronting Europe within the terrain of its own discourse (the nation-state), as it were. It is also in this context that we can understand a latter-day Japanese ideology on the "East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere" during World War II. It also aimed to recover the "ancient glory of the spiritual life of Asian peoples", "eschew dependence on Europe and America" and foster a "new Oriental capitalist culture" (TEIJI, 1975) .
In India, two writers stand out: Vivekanda (1863 Vivekanda ( -1902 and Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel Prize-winning Indian poet. Vivekanda claims that while the West produces giants in science and politics, Asia is well-known for its giants in ILAIAH, 1996; BIDWAI, 2008; RATAN, 1998) . We recall that the EATWOT postreligional paradigm exempts Hinduism from the list of doctrinally controlling Neolithic religions. Hinduism, it says, is "a religion without truths" (EATWOT, 2012, p. 271) . In fact, EATWOT's bifurcation of "religions" and "spirituality" reminds us of Geertz' dualistic and essentialist definition of religion as external symbols vs. internal motivations and meanings. Insofar as the post-religional paradigm essentializes "religion" and "spirituality" in its discourse and forgets an actual analysis of power that makes the discourse possible, it falls into the same trap as these strategic religious and cultural revivals.
Beyond (Neo)Orientalism and Asianism
Let me summarize the arguments made thus far. When we wanted to ask if
Asia is a 'post-religional society', we first determined which 'Asia' we are talking about. We have identified two main discourses on the 'idea of Asia': neo-Orientalist Asia and Asianist Asia. The first is a Western discourse about its colonized peoples; the second is Asia's self-representation vis-à-vis its (neo)colonizers. These discourses exercise real consequences on which religions are discussed, mobilized and classified. Different as these two positions are, they in fact converge on some common glaring difficulties. 24 First, both of them came to be used as ideological tools to maintain some sense of dominance over its 'other'. The Orientalist and neo-Orientalist discourse on Asia is an inherent function of the imperial and neoimperial enterprise. The imperial power needs to construct its other in a way that is profitable to the (neo)colonial project, that is, the continuous subjugation of its colonies -both in social as well as mental structures. The 'Asianist' discourse, on the other hand, has been also blamed as an ideological strategy to keep some structures of cultural and political dominance in place. Second, both positions are engaged in essentializing the other. Such a discourse forgets that all assertions of a 307 cultural group about itself (i.e., values, traits, identities) are constructed under specific socio-historical conditions. It is not so much the values themselves considered metaphysically and transhistorically as those social conditions that provide the key to our understanding of these realities. The Orientalist discourse freezes Asian identity as 'unchanging', 'mysterious', 'religious' -one which is not (yet) comparable with the modern Enlightenment the West was trying to promote.
The 'Asianist' discourse likewise pegs Asian identity into its essentialist characteristics, while being consistent with its program of combating the onslaught of Western decadence that comes with capitalism and modernity (HOON, 2004) .
The problem with these essentialized characteristics is that they become EATWOT's post-religional paradigm needs to be cognizant of these loopholes if it wants to effectively contribute to the analysis of religions in these changing times. As it is tentatively articulated, the theological proposal displays a sense of theoretical ambivalence. On the one hand, its evolutionary directions as seen in its commonalities with Bellah's project, the secularization thesis and post-secular discourses lead it to an Orientalist discourse of Asian religious sensibilities and essentialized views of religions and spiritualities. On the other hand, its noncumulative view of cultural evolution (i.e., the disappearance of old Neolithic religions and maybe future religions for that matter) which we assessed as parallel to Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigm shifts" in science gives the theologian a reflexive sensibility to the emerging but still inchoate forms of spiritualities, religious experiences and practices that proceed from and make real sense in the lives of people on the ground. But it is also this strength which turns itself into weakness when the search for the 'spiritual' and 'religious' becomes a pursuit of the essential and the universal (most often equated with the human) beyond those which it considers as the transitory forms of 'religions' (EATWOT, 2012, p. 263) . 26
Religions: Back to the Rough Grounds
In the end, we are thus led back to the first question: "Is Asia a postreligional society?" The query does not possess one single answer; or, if we push our established assumptions to their logical conclusions, it is impossible to answer it at all. Following Talal Asad, it is imperative to situate the inquiry on religions in the context of socio-historical conditions (movements, classes, institutions, and ideologies -all vehicles of social power) that make religious experience possible.
And these power-laden contexts are complex, diverse and multiple. Only through such process can we avoid essentialist views of religion applicable to all locations and epoch. What comes to mind is an image which the neo-Marxist philosopher, Raymond Williams, uses for "art": the notion of art as "practice". Translating it to our concerns, religions are not only "mediums" -"objects, things, which men [sic] take up and arrange into particular forms to express or communicate information" like doctrines, rituals, practices defined in abstraction and isolated from the sociohistorical powers that produced them. No, religious dogmas, beliefs and practices must be inevitably seen as "social practices" by bringing them back to the social 309 processes of their "material production" (WILLIAMS, 1978, p. 163-164) . Only in the context of these grounds shall we see their effectively historical meanings, development and interrelations.
Let me illustrate this point with some examples. Although the prevalent religious dualisms "transcendence-immanence", "sacred-profane", "spiritualmaterial" continue to be universalized in many discourses, the meaning of the binaries in fact does not remain constant. Some socio-historical contexts consider that the spirits can be material or the sacred does not at all mean transcendental, as evidenced by the early colonial encounters between the Spanish missionaries and Filipino 'natives'. 27 While the Spanish missionaries proclaimed the traditional Catholic doctrines of God, spirits and souls as transcendent, the Filipino natives thought of them as "this-worldly". The kaluluwa (souls) of our ancestors are always with us. They also "eat" as we offer them food on their graves and on family altars on special occasions; or we send them their favorite drink or cigar on their coffins as provisions for their "journey". The nono (spirits) are not transcendental sacred figures but "indeterminate auras emanating from certain objects in nature -trees, rocks, rivers, fields, even crocodiles." (RAFAEL, 1993, p. 113) . They reside with us in the same world so much so that when people urinate in the fields or pass big trees on forests, they need to ask their permission by saying "tabi po" (let us through). We can haggle and bargain with them, offer oblations but also send pleas to and coax them into granting special favors. All these tendencies are still present in contemporary Filipino spirituality. Its linguistic residues still abound: the Tagalog word for asking for forgiveness is "tawad", for instance, as it is used in sacramental confession. But this same root word also means "to bargain, haggle or to use evasions (in Spanish regatear)" (RAFAEL, 1988, p. 91-109) . Such a discourse can only be understood from the perspective of pre-colonial social structures characterized by "forms of indebtedness and servitude that were transferable and negotiable" and where social positions were not fixed but alterable. In these social universes, rendering tribute to the nono or kneeling down in confession was not seen as total submission to immutable transcendental power but were "ways of bargaining... plugging into a circuit of indebtedness in which one could hope to accumulate the means to shift social registers." (BOLASCO, 1994, p. 228) . Of course, there were also some whose spirituality largely leaned toward the other side of the binary, i.e., the transcendent dimension. But this direction was only "particularly appealing to those 'natives' who had a special stake in the preservation of relations of inequality" -the ruling classes (the principalia). Such specific nuances as these can only be understood on the ground and are absent in the essentialist rendering and universal application of these binary relations.
The shifting meaning of purdah as religious and social practice is another example (SHEHABUDDIN, 2008) . Purdah is a custom among Muslim or Hindu women of dressing in enveloped clothes or living behind curtains or separate rooms in order to segregate them from men and strangers. In dominant secular discourses, the practice has been criticised as an instrument of oppression, a way to domesticate women by limiting their movement, thus, also their agency and possibilities. On the one hand, it is an act of perpetuating male domination and reproducing gender inequality: "the male being self-reliant and aggressive, the female weak, irresponsible, and in need of protection." (WHITE, 1977) . On the other hand, purdah is practiced to protect women from harassment, from being portrayed as sex objects and securing their mobility and safety in public spaces.
Moreover, others think that purdah becomes an assertion of subaltern gender and cultural identities toward some heightened status and visibility in contemporary social spaces (FELDMAN, MCCARTHY, 1983) . How are these discursive battles wrestled with on the ground? In Bangladesh, there are poor rural women working in factories who discard the practice neither by rejecting the Islamic injunction outright nor by exhibiting total agreement with the secularist agenda, but through re-defining purdah as "a state of mind, a purity of thought, something that they carry inside them rather than an expensive outer garment" (SHEHABUDDIN, 2008, p. 4) . The same act is both a critique of gender domination in Islamic universes and the pretensions of class in modern societies done through a clever Dossier: Post-religional paradigm -Article: Is Asia a 'Post Religional' Society? The Post-Religional Paradigm and its Others
Horizonte, Belo Horizonte, vol. 13, no. 37, p. 279-318, Jan./Mar 2015 -ISSN 2175 311 reinterpretation of Islamic theology. In the process, these poor women have navigated dexterously between the Islamist and secularist agenda by reinventing themselves as "pious Muslim women", but also securing spaces necessary for the survival of their families. This analysis is not quite accessible in the easy essentialist application of "modern-traditional" or "secular-religious" binary categories. In this actual negotiation of power on the ground, the modern is not necessarily secular nor the religious always traditional.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude with a famous passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein:
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk, so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (WITTGENSTEIN, 1958, p. 46 ).
Wittgenstein was critiquing the crystalline purity of logic that does not work in real life. I am transposing its relevance to the study of religions. 28 Essentialist and universalist accounts detach concepts from the grounds of their material production. On the one hand, they do not produce friction. These concepts and definitions can enter and leave different historical epochs intact and unscathed. On the other hand, they are also deceptive and ineffective. With them, to use the words of Asad, "we shall not make much headway in understanding agency." (ASAD, 1993, p. 167 
